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ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF SEXUALLY 
VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE BOSNIAN WAR CRIMES 
CHAMBER: APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE ICTY 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the extensive use of sexual violence as a weapon in war throughout 
history, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was the 
first international tribunal to develop criminal jurisprudence concerning 
sexual violence. Although the ICTY expanded criminal liability for sexually 
violent acts committed during the Yugoslav Wars to an unprecedented extent, 
the conviction rate for sexually violent crimes was much lower than the 
conviction rate for other crime. 
This Comment will explore the dissonance between the expansion of 
criminal liability for sexually violent crimes and the low conviction rate for 
these crimes. Cases, eyewitness reports, and interviews with ICTY prosecutors 
provide insight on the possible causes of this dissonance. This comment argues 
that the low conviction rate in the ICTY for sexually violent crimes is the result 
of several factors: (1) a lack of expertise in the Office of the Prosecutor, (2) 
gender bias (3) the reluctance of victims to testify, and (4) the lack of 
coordination between the Office of the Prosecutor and the Victim and 
Witnesses Unit. 
Understanding the reasons behind the ICTY’s low conviction rate is 
especially important as the ICTY shifts its caseload to the national court 
system. Just because the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber is inheriting the 
ICTY’s cases does not mean the War Crimes Chamber must inherit the ICTY’s 
difficulties in prosecuting sexually violent crimes. Although the War Crimes 
Chamber will face many of the same difficulties—gender bias, lack of 
expertise, victim reluctance—the ICTY’s successes and failures in prosecuting 
sexually violent crimes can provide guidance. By applying the lessons learned 
in the ICTY, the War Crimes Chambers will be able to successfully prosecute 
sexually violent crimes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“He forced me to take my clothes off. I didn’t want to take my clothes off. 
He slapped my face and told me to get undressed. I didn’t want to do this. 
Then he tried again and ripped everything off me. He ripped my knickers off 
me, and then he raped me. . . .[He] said that it was quite natural. ‘You’re not 
the only Muslim to be raped. Other Muslim women have been raped in other 
villages, and that is nothing terrible,’ and that I had no right to protect myself. 
And he said, ‘You’re going to bear Serb children, not Muslims any more,’ and 
that there won’t be a single Muslim left . . . .”1 
During periods of armed conflict, rape and other forms of sexual abuse are 
used as instruments of violence and terror. Military history is filled with 
reports of sexual violence directed against women.2 The systematic use of rape 
as a weapon has many purposes: to destroy communities, to force 
impregnation, and to drive out populations from a specific territory.3 Sexual 
violence’s ability to disintegrate communities makes it an especially potent 
tool of war.4 
Until recently, despite the calculated use of sexual violence as a weapon of 
war, rape was not a crime that could be prosecuted under international law.5 
Instead of a crime, sexual violence was simply seen as an unfortunate by-
product of war.6 Historically, victims of sexual violence during conflict have 
had little legal recourse because rape was viewed as part of the “spoils of 
 
 1 Transcript of Record at 2639–40, Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & 23-1-T (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 2, 2000). 
 2 Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War by Land Before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE 
LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 26 (Michael Howard ed., 1979) (“A free hand with the girls seems always to 
have been a basic component of what the common soldier hopes for, believes he deserves, and feels entitled 
[to receive] . . . .The literature of war is full of evidence of this disagreeable dark edge to military behavior.”).  
 3 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 16, 49, 53, 79–80 (1975). 
 4 See id. at 31–113. 
 5 Ariane Brunet & Stephanie Rousseau, Acknowledging Violations, Struggling against Impunity: 
Women’s Rights, Human Rights, in COMMON GROUNDS: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN WAR AND ARMED 
CONFLICT SITUATIONS 33 (Indai Lourdes Sajor ed., Peter Feldstein trans., 1998) [hereinafter COMMON 
GROUNDS].  
 6 See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the 
Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women: Violence Against Women 
Perpetrated and/or Condoned by the State During Times of Armed Conflict (1997–2000), Comm’n on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73, para. 23 (Jan. 23, 2001) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy) (explaining how the 
ICTY chose to prosecute rape as a crime against humanity “[i]nstead of falling back on the often heard claim 
that rape is a random or arbitrary act perpetrated by soldiers in search of an outlet for sexual energy . . . .”). 
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war.”7 Sexual violence was viewed as an assault on a woman’s honor—a 
private affair that should be kept out of the realm of the international legal 
system.8 
This view began to shift in the 1990s, when there was recognition that 
sexually violent crimes must be tried at an international level to begin the 
healing process for the victims.9 The international community also discovered 
that allowing impunity for sexually violent crimes undermines community-
building in post-conflict societies.10 Rape is now a crime under international 
law, although “it remains the least condemned war crime.”11 
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (“ICTY”) has played a leading 
role in developing the jurisprudence of sexually violent crimes. The judgments 
of the ICTY have greatly expanded the articulation of sexually violent crimes 
during armed conflict.12 Scholars generally agree that the ICTY’s progressive 
 
 7 Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, July 
31–Aug. 18, 2000, para. 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21 (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery]; see also Mary Robinson, Message from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in 
COMMON GROUNDS, supra note 5, at 21 (“The official failure to condemn or punish rape, giving it overt 
political sanction, allows for rape and other forms of sexual torture and ill-treatment to become tools of 
military strategy.”). 
 8 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Further Promotion 
and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme 
and Methods of Work of the Commission: Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United 
Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, para. 11, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (Jan. 26, 1998) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy) (“By using the honour paradigm, 
linked as it is to concepts of chastity, purity and virginity, stereotypical concepts of femininity have been 
formally enshrined in humanitarian law . . . . When rape is perceived as a crime against honour or morality, 
shame commonly ensues for the victim, who is often viewed by the community as ‘dirty’ or ‘spoiled’. 
Consequently, many women will neither report nor discuss the violence that has been perpetrated against 
them.”); see also Radhika Coomaraswamy, Message from the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, in COMMON GROUNDS, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
 9 See Contemporary Forms of Slavery, supra note 7, para. 91 at 22. Article 1 of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women defines “violence against women” as “any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, 
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in 
private life.” G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 1, UN Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994).  
 10 See Contemporary Forms of Slavery, supra note 7, para. 89 at 21–22; see also COUNCIL OF EUR. 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, POST-WAR JUSTICE AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 25–26 
(2012) (detailing the damage to community-building continuing caused by impunity for the rapists).  
 11 Brunet & Rousseau, supra note 5, at 37.  
 12 The ICTY has prosecuted rape as a war crime, a crime against humanity. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & 23/1-T, Judgement, para. 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 
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jurisprudence on sexual violence during armed conflict has been a significant 
victory.13 
Unfortunately, scholars celebrating this victory have ignored a major issue: 
Sexually violent crimes are not being prosecuted successfully. Despite the 
advancement of the gender-based crimes jurisprudence in the ICTY, the 
overall number of prosecutions and successful convictions remains low.14 In all 
ICTY cases that had been completed as of April 2011, ninety-three individuals 
were indicted; forty-four of those individuals were indicted for crimes 
involving sexual violence.15 These numbers show that only forty-seven percent 
of individuals indicted in the ICTY were indicted for a sexually violent 
crime.16 Of those forty-four individuals, only twenty-nine were convicted of 
sexual violence, representing a conviction rate of sixty-nine percent.17 
Although a conviction rate of sixty-nine percent appears high, it is much lower 
than conviction rates for other forms of crime. For completed cases, in which 
the accused was not charged with a crime of sexual violence, the conviction 
rate was seventy-eight percent.18 Even more striking, in nine cases with an 
indictment for sexual violence, the indictee was acquitted of sexual violence 
charges while being found guilty on all other counts.19 The low success rate of 
 
18, 2006). It has also prosecuted rape as an instrument of genocide. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case 
No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, para. 172 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). It has 
recognized rape as a form of sexual slavery as well as a form of persecution. See, e.g., Kunarac, Case No. IT-
96-23-T & 23/1-T, para. 542. Furthermore, the ICTY has recognized that gender-based crimes may form part 
of a joint criminal enterprise. Richard P. Barrett & Laura E. Little, Lessons of the Yugoslav Rape Trials: A 
Role for Conspiracy Law in International Tribunals, 88 MINN. L. REV. 30, 53 (2003). The ICTY has 
pronounced that several perpetrators may be held responsible for intended or foreseeable crimes committed in 
furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise. Giulia Bigi, Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Prosecution of Senior Political and 
Military Leaders: The Krajišnik Case, 14 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 51, 53–54 (2010). The ICTY 
has also recognized that men and boys may be victims of sexual violence. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. 
IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 206, 726 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). 
Finally, the ICTY has explicitly recognized that forced marriage, forced pregnancy, and forced abortions may 
constitute international crimes. U.N. ENTITY FOR GEND. EQUAL. & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, PROGRESS 
OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 82, 86, 97 (2011).  
 13 For example, Cynthia Enloe optimistically claimed that the ICTY would usher in a new era of 
international political consciousness—the era in which “the construction of the entire international political 
arena [would] be significantly less vulnerable to patriarchy.” Cynthia Enloe, Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened 
a New Era of Feminist Consciousness?, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA–HERZEGOVINA 
220 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994).  
 14 U.N. ENTITY FOR GEND. EQUAL. & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 12, at 90–91. 
 15 Id. at 90. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 91. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id. 
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prosecutions illustrates that the creation of a feminist-friendly jurisprudence is 
not sufficient to effectively prosecute sexually violent crimes in international 
law. The evolution of substantive jurisprudence must be accompanied by an 
improvement of the procedural aspects of a prosecution for sexual violence. 
This Comment will examine the breakdown between the ICTY’s evolving 
jurisprudence of sexually violent crimes and the difficulty of securing a 
conviction for these crimes. The obstacles that must be overcome to 
successfully prosecute sexual violence include inexperience, gender bias, 
ineffective witness protections, lack of inter-division cooperation, and 
prosecutorial errors. 
This Comment argues that the lessons learned from the ICTY’s struggles 
should be used by the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber (“WCC”), which will 
take over the ICTY’s caseload in 2014.20 The WCC faces many of the same 
challenges—both jurisprudential and procedural—that have been addressed by 
the ICTY. Therefore, by using the lessons learned from the ICTY, the WCC 
can effectively investigate and prosecute sexually violent crimes. 
Part I of this Comment outlines the history of the Yugoslav Wars and their 
impact on the former Yugoslavia. Part II examines the ICTY’s jurisprudence 
on sexually violent crimes. Part III examines how the combination of 
prosecutorial discretion and the inherent difficulty of prosecuting sexually 
violent crimes has led to ineffective investigations and prosecutions. Part IV 
illustrates how, without a coherent gender strategy, prosecutions can be 
derailed by simple prosecutorial error. Part V examines the ICTY’s completion 
strategy and the transfer of its caseload to the WCC. Finally, Part VI examines 
how the WCC can use the lessons learned by the ICTY to successfully 
prosecute sexually violent crimes. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The atrocities of the Yugoslav Wars precipitated the need for prosecuting 
sexually violent crimes under international law. The Yugoslav Wars were the 
first to bring reports of mass rape and other sexually violent crimes into the 
 
 20 See Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Completion Strategy, ICTY-TPIY, 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10016 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Completion Strategy]. The Bosnian 
War Crimes Chamber (“WCC”) is a domestic court. See Frequently Asked Questions, CT. BOSN. & HERZ., 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=7&id=15&jezik=e. 
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public eye.21 Furthermore, the Serbian use of sexually violent crimes to 
facilitate ethnic cleansing spurred the recognition of such crimes under 
international law.22 
A. History of the Yugoslav Wars 
The Yugoslav Wars were a series of wars that resulted in the dissolution of 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995.23 The Yugoslav 
Wars were comprised of three separate, but related, wars: the “Ten-Day War” 
in Slovenia (1991), the Croatian War of Independence (1991 to 1995), and the 
Bosnian War (1992 to 1995).24 These three wars resulted in the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia into several sovereign territories.25 The causes of the Yugoslav 
Wars are numerous and complex. In general, the outbreak of civil war in the 
former Yugoslavia was precipitated by intense cultural, religious, linguistic, 
and ethnic tensions.26 
By 1991, the state of Yugoslavia existed in name only. Yugoslavia had 
fractured into regions controlled by ethnic groups.27 The Serbian effort to 
regain control of Bosnia introduced the world to a violent policy now known as 
“ethnic cleansing,” which the U.N. Security Council defined as “rendering an 
area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons 
of given groups from the area.”28 The wars in Yugoslavia have since been 
“held up as the paradigmatic examples of ethnic conflict” and “extremest 
nationalism leading to violence.”29 
 
 21 Shana Swiss & Joan Giller, Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective, 270 JAMA 612, 612 
(1993). 
 22 See Rhoda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into 
International Criminal Law, 46 MCGILL L.J. 217, 228 (2000). 
 23 Monica Oproiu, Slobodan Milosevic and the Violent Transformation of Borders in Former Yugoslavia, 
EUROLIMES, Spring 2011, at 142, 148. 
 24 Id. at 149. 
 25 Id. at 148. 
 26 See id. at 146–48. 
 27 Id. at 148. 
 28 Comm’n of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992), Interim Rep., 
transmitted by letter dated Feb. 9, 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Counsel, para. 55, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Jan. 26, 1993). A Commission of Experts sponsored by the Security 
Council concluded that ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia had been carried out “by means of murder, torture, 
arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civilian 
population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate 
military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property.” Id. 
para. 56. 
 29 V. P. GAGNON JR., THE MYTH OF ETHNIC WAR: SERBIA AND CROATIA IN THE 1990S, at xix (2004). 
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B. Rape in the Yugoslav Wars 
The nationalist sentiment that justified “ethnic cleansing” included 
organized campaigns of sexual violence. In addition to the systematic and 
deliberate use of torture and murder, the Serb faction engaged in mass rapes.30 
Reports of mass rapes have included stories of 
[T]he repeated rapes of girls as young as 6 and 7; violations by 
neighbors and strangers alike; gang rapes so brutal their victims died; 
rape camps where Serbs routinely abused and murdered Muslim and 
Croat women; rapes of young girls performed in front of fathers, 
mothers, siblings and children; [and] rapes committed explicitly to 
impregnate Muslim women and hold them captive until they gave 
birth to Serbian babies.31 
An investigative commission sent by the U.N. Security Council concluded that 
the rape of Muslim women had occurred on “a wide scale” and as “part of a 
clearly recognizable pattern.”32 An estimated fifty to sixty thousand women 
were raped during the Yugoslav Wars.33 The victims were primarily Muslim 
women from Bosnia–Herzegovina.34 An estimated thirty-five thousand women 
and children were held in “rape camps,” the purpose of which was to allow 
Serbians to impregnate Bosnian women.35 Because of the patrilineal structure 
 
 30 Tom Post, A Pattern of Rape, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32. 
 31 Id.; see also Comm’n of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992), Final 
Rep., transmitted by letter dated May 24, 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council, paras.245–48, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (Dec. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Letter dated May 24].  
 32 European Community Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Report to European Community Foreign Ministers, in a letter dated Feb. 2, 1993 from the 
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, para.13, U.N. 
Doc. S/25240, Annex I (Feb. 3, 1993). 
 33 Aida Cerkez, U.N. Official: Bosnian War Rapes Must Be Prosecuted, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 26, 
2010, available at http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2013527330_apeubosniawartimerape.html. In the 
final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts, Professor Bassiouni indicates that there are six main 
reasons for the disparity between the estimates of rapes in the former Yugoslavia: (1) victims are “reluctant to 
report the assaults”; (2) victims “fear reprisals by their attackers”; (3) victims, especially Muslim victims, feel 
intense shame and embarrassment; (4) a long time has passed since the crime was committed; (5) victims “do 
not have a place to report the assault or feel that reporting would be useless”; and (6) there is a general “level 
of skepticism about the international community.” Letter dated May 24, supra note 31, para. 6.  
 34 See Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in 
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Comm’n on Human Rights, para. 84, U.N. Doc. A/48/92-S/25341, 
Annex (Feb. 26, 1993) (by Tadeusz Mazowiecki) (“Rape of women, including minors, has occurred on a large 
scale. . . .The team of experts is not aware of any attempts by those in positions of power, either military or 
political, to stop the rapes. There is clear evidence that Croat, Muslim and Serb women have been detained for 
extended periods of time and repeatedly raped.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 35 See ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR 9 (2005). 
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of Bosnian culture, the resulting children would inherit their father’s ethnicity: 
Serbian.36 After being raped and impregnated, the women were confined until 
it was too late to terminate the pregnancy.37 
The use of mass rape and other forms of sexual violence as a core part of 
ethnic cleansing illustrates that the nationalism was a mostly male sentiment.38 
Men were viewed as soldiers, women as victims: “Bands of males may assert 
their manhood as warriors, but war affords women no corresponding 
empowering role; instead they become victims, not only displaced and 
damaged, mourning the loss of family members, but also prey for men on the 
enemy side.”39 
Because of the intense influence of nationalism and misogyny40 that led to 
sexual atrocities against women in the Yugoslav Wars, the prosecution of 
sexual violence is incredibly important: “[R]ape as a tool of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
is unique, worse than or not comparable to other forms of rape in war or in 
peace . . . .”41 Indeed, rape and other forms of sexual violence have been cited 
as major factors in undermining post-conflict peace resolution processes.42 
Prosecuting sexually violent crimes leads not only to retributive and restorative 
justice, but also to an international condemnation of the mindsets that led to 
their committal in the first place. 
 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. The horrific circumstances of such enforced pregnancies certainly shocked the international 
community. However, some commentators argue that merely denouncing forced impregnation and forced 
pregnancy is insufficient; rather, these issues must “be construed not as the ‘natural’ consequence of rape but 
rather as violations of women’s right to reproductive health, hence control over their fecundity; as crimes, 
violations in and of themselves, not mere consequences. Brunet & Rousseau, supra note 5, at 33, 39.  
 38 See Cynthia Enloe, The Politics of Masculinity and Feminity in Nationalist Wars, CURIOUS FEMINIST 
(2004). A gendered reading of the Yugoslav Wars—especially of the Bosnian War—has become popular in 
the past decade. CYNTHIA COCKBURN, THE SPACE BETWEEN US: NEGOTIATING GENDER AND NATIONAL 
IDENTITIES IN CONFLICT 206 (1998) (stating that in Bosnia, the “so-called ethnic war was totally gendered”). 
 39 SWANEE HUNT, THIS WAS NOT OUR WAR: BOSNIAN WOMEN RECLAIMING THE PEACE 179 (2004); see 
also GAGNON, supra note 29, at 67 (describing the Serbian media’s manipulation of rape reports to promote 
fear during a period of nationalist hysteria); Robinson, supra note 7, at 20. 
 40 See Indai Loudes Sajor, Our Common Grounds, in COMMON GROUNDS, supra note 5, at 3 (“War is an 
inherently patriarchal activity, and rape is one of the most extreme expressions of the patriarchal drive toward 
masculine domination over the woman. This patriarchal ideology is further enforced by the aggressive 
character of the war itself, that is to dominate and control another nation or people.”). 
 41 Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243, 247 (1994). 
 42 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1820 
(2008), para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/2009/362 (Aug. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Report]. 
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II. SEXUALLY VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE ICTY 
Like most other historical international documents,43 the ICTY Statute 
mostly avoids the explicit recognition of gendered crimes.44 The exception is 
Article 5, which explicitly lists rape as a crime against humanity.45 Prosecuting 
a crime against humanity requires a heavy burden of proof; a prosecutor must 
prove there was a “widespread and systematic attack” on civilians during an 
armed conflict.46 In turn, investigations into possible crimes against humanity 
can be problematic because evidence must be gathered under post-conflict 
conditions.47 Prosecuting rape as a crime against humanity, therefore, means a 
difficult investigation and a heavy burden of proof on the ICTY Prosecutor. 
Fortunately, the ICTY has judicially expanded its subject matter 
jurisdiction to cover a broader range of sexually violent crimes. Although other 
forms of sexual violence are not explicitly mentioned anywhere else in the 
ICTY Statute, ICTY judicial opinions have found sexual violence to be within 
the jurisdiction of the court because it is: (1) a “grave breach[]” under the 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949; (2) a violation of the laws or custom 
of war; and (3) a form of genocide.48 Consequently, the ICTY may obtain 
subject matter jurisdiction over many forms of sexual violence. 
These judicial expansions have been greatly praised as advancements 
towards the successful prosecution of sexually violent crimes in international 
 
 43 See Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes Under the 
International Criminal Court, BROWN J. WORLD AFF., Winter/Spring 1999, at 65, 70–71. 
 44 See id. at 71.  
 45 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5(g), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/827, (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter Statute of the ICTY] (adopting the Statute as proposed by the 
Secretary-General, in U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex (May 3, 1993)). 
 46 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appellate Judgement, para. 85 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002). The ICTY has interpreted this to mean “widespread or 
systematic.” Id. (emphasis added).  
 47 See U.N. ENTITY FOR GEND. EQUAL. & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 12, at 90. 
 48 ANGELA M. BANKS, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
AD HOC TRIBUNAL’S JURISPRUDENCE & THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S ELEMENTS OF CRIMES 7 
(2005), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1326&context=facpubs; see 
also Brunet & Rousseau, supra note 5, at 47 (“Rape and other forms of sexual violence directly linked to a 
genocidal intention indeed qualify as crimes of genocide, for the following reasons . . . these crimes inflict 
serious physical and/or mental injury contributing to the destruction of the targeted group; they can give rise to 
the victims’ inability to give birth again, which, in turn, has a direct link with the physical destruction of the 
group.”).  
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law.49 For the first time, perpetrators of sexual violence were brought to justice 
for sexually violent crimes committed during armed conflict.50 But while the 
jurisprudence of sexually violent crimes has undergone an unprecedented 
expansion, the ICTY still faces many substantial procedural challenges in 
prosecuting these crimes. These challenges include the inherent difficulties of 
prosecuting sexually violent crimes, such as lack of expertise, gender bias, 
victim reluctance, and lack of coordination between the Office of the 
Prosecutor (“OTP”) and the Victim and Witnesses Unit (“VWU”). 
III.  THE INHERENT DIFFICULTY OF PROSECUTING SEXUALLY VIOLENT CRIMES 
Prosecuting sexually violent crimes committed during armed conflicts is 
inherently difficult. For the ICTY, these difficulties included: (1) a lack of 
expertise in the OTP; (2) gender bias present in the OTP; (3) the reluctance of 
victims to testify; and (4) the lack of coordination between the OTP and the 
VWU. Each of these difficulties and its effects on prosecutions will be 
discussed in turn. 
A. Lack of Expertise in the Office of the Prosecutor 
The first obstacle in prosecuting crimes successfully was the OTP’s general 
lack of expertise in leading investigations of sexual violence. In the ICTY, 
referrals by the Bosnian police and judiciary were especially problematic. 
In Bosnia–Herzegovina, a criminal case destined for the ICTY usually 
began with a complaint to the local police authorities.51 After the initial 
investigation by police, the case could only proceed after the OTP had 
reviewed the case file and determined there was sufficient evidence to 
continue.52 The Prosecutor reviewed only the case file before making a 
 
 49 SIOBHAN KEHOE DUBIN, CASE W. RESERVE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW INT’L WAR CRIMES RESEARCH LAB, A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE TRIALS IN THE ICTY AND ICTR COMPARING SIX PARTICULAR 
ISSUES 4–9 (2003), available at http://law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal/memoranda/SexualViolence. 
pdf. 
 50 See id. at 9 (“The judicial acknowledgment and punishment of rape during an armed conflict was 
historic, and was also a vitally important precedent for both the ICTY and ICTR in regard to sexual violence 
trials.”). Precedent regarding rape as torture, as held by courts such as the ICTY, is significant in providing a 
new avenue for remedy and protection for rape victims, which had not been consistently available under other 
instruments. See Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 43. 
 51 Mark S. Ellis, Bringing Justice to an Embattled Region—Creating and Implementing the “Rules of the 
Road” for Bosnia–Herzegovina, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1999). 
 52 Id. at 16. 
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decision.53 The OTP did not interview witnesses, did not make decisions about 
whether national authorities had complied with international legal standards, 
and did not review national criminal laws for their compliance with 
international standards.54 
The OTP’s heavy reliance on the Bosnian police to investigate crimes was 
especially troubling because of the widespread corruption throughout the legal 
system. Many of the governmental leaders in power after the war were the 
same leaders responsible for international crimes during the war.55 Bosnian 
politicians had the authority to appoint judges and prosecutors, and politicians 
packed the judiciary with individuals of their ethnic group.56 The judicial 
system and law enforcement structures were ineffectual, weak, and unprepared 
to address powerful figures for their violations of international law.57 The 
corruption of the national legal system and the untrained investigators 
contributed to the relatively few investigations and indictments for any 
sexually violent crime in Bosnia.58 
B. Gender Bias in the Office of the Prosecutor 
The ICTY’s second obstacle in prosecuting sexually violent crimes was the 
inherent gender bias in the OTP. The first Prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, was 
“amazed at the gender bias that emerged in our international office.”59 The 
gender bias inhibited effective investigations, impeded the development of 
rape jurisprudence, and resulted in unequal treatment of male and female 
victims. 
Gender bias prevented investigators from adequately investigating sexually 
violent crimes. Originally, there were virtually no senior female investigators, 
and the male investigators came from cultures where there was generally no 
 
 53 Id. at 14. 
 54 Id. at 16. 
 55 Sebastian van de Vliet, Addressing Corruption and Organized Crime in the Context of Re-establishing 
the Rule of Law, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION 206 (Dina Francesca Haynes ed., 2008). 
 56 Fidelma Donlon, Rule of Law: From the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to 
the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 
55, at 264. 
 57 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., COURTING DISASTER: THE MISRULE OF LAW BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2 
(2002); U.N. MISSION IN BOSN. & HERZ., PROSECUTING CORRUPTION: A STUDY OF THE WEAKNESSES OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 5 (2000).  
 58 U.N. ENTITY FOR GEND. EQUAL. & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 12. 
 59 Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as A War Crimes, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 277, 280 
(2002). 
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concern about gender-based crimes.60 These male investigators often 
downplayed the seriousness of sexual assault. One assistant prosecutor recalls 
hearing investigators state: “So a bunch of guys got riled up after a day of war, 
what’s the big deal?”61 and “I’ve got ten dead bodies, how do I have time for 
rape? That’s not as important.”62 Investigators in the OTP worried that 
prioritizing sexual assault cases would jeopardize the “larger” cases of 
genocide.63 Female attorneys would often have to re-interview victims and 
witnesses after the male investigators had completed a cursory and inadequate 
interview.64 This gender bias prevented the thorough investigation and 
indictment of sexually violent crimes. 
The gender bias in the OTP may have also stalled the jurisprudence of rape 
from developing in the ICTY. The only form of sexual violence explicitly 
listed in the ICTY is rape, which is charged as a crime against humanity.65 
Therefore, the OTP—at least initially—“did not charge rape directly as a war 
crime . . . [it] charged rape as an act of outrage against personal dignity, which 
was a war crime.”66 The OTP did not refer to rape as direct evidence of another 
war crime, such as genocide.67 Instead of treating rape as a form of torture, and 
therefore as a war crime, the OTP preferred to treat rape as a “degrading 
treatment” and “willful[ly] caus[ing] great suffering” which would qualify as a 
“grave breach.”68 
The gender bias is especially evident in the disparate ways the OTP treated 
sexual violence against women and sexual violence against men in the Tadić 
Case.69 In this case the OTP treated the same type of sexual violence in two 
separate ways depending on the gender of the victim. If the sexually violent act 
was committed against a woman, the act was prosecuted as a “grave breach.”70 
In contrast, if that same sexually violent act was committed against a man, the 
 
 60 Id.; see also Peggy Kuo, Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International Tribunal, 34 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 310–11 (2002). 
 61 Kuo, supra note 60, at 311. 
 62 Id. at 310–11. 
 63 JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 52 
(2003). 
 64 Id. at 78. 
 65 See Statute of the ICTY, supra note 45, art. 5(g). 
 66 Kuo, supra note 60, at 314. 
 67 See id.  
 68 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Indictment, paras. 4.2–.3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 13, 1995). 
 69 Copelon, supra note 22, at 230. 
 70 See id. 
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act was prosecuted as a “war crime.”71 By letting the gender of the victim 
determine the crime to be charged, the OTP illustrated its gender bias against 
women.72 
Though gender bias was initially prevalent in the OTP, the subsequent 
incorporation of a comprehensive gender strategy alleviated much of the bias.73 
Developed by Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, the comprehensive and 
cohesive gender strategy played an integral role in recognizing the crime of 
rape under international law. Perhaps his most important contribution was the 
creation of the office of a Gender Advisor in the OTP.74 The Gender Advisor 
“was charged with developing the law through formulating the approach of the 
OTP to the investigation and indictment of gender crimes. [The Gender 
Advisor] also devised the approach of the OTP to gender issues within the 
office itself.”75 
One of the Gender Advisor’s first recommendations was the creation of a 
“sexual investigation team.”76 This sexual investigation team was comprised 
completely of women who had extensive experience investigating sexually 
violent crimes.77 Although the team was disbanded after several years, its 
influence was felt in the greater understanding of how to investigate sexually 
violent crimes.78 The creation of the position of Gender Advisor and the all-
 
 71 Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Initial Indictment, paras. 5.2–.4; see also Copelon, supra note 22, at 230.  
 72 The judge who confirmed the charges against Tadić, Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito, questioned the 
OTP’s charging decision and told the OTP: “Do not forget the women.” Sara Sharratt, Interview with Elizabeth 
Odio Benito, Justice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 22 WOMEN & 
THERAPY, no. 1, 1999, at 39, 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Odio Benito later stated:  
If we had started working on cases from an armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia where the 
United Nations legal documents documented massive rape of women and there was not a single 
mention of rape in this indictment, I thought I had a very valid reason for expressing my concern. 
I was worried that once again we were going to invisibilize what had happened to women with 
the pretext that we did not have any evidence or that no one was talking about rape. 
Id. at 41–42. 
 73 Rhonda Copelon recalls Goldstone beginning a training session on rape by admitting: “I am the idiot 
who filed that affidavit.” Copelon, supra note 22, at 245. 
 74 Julie Mertus, When Adding Women Matters: Women’s Participation in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1297, 1303 (2008).  
 75 Richard J. Goldstone & Estelle A. Dehon, Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes Under 
International Criminal Law, NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y, Fall/Winter 2003–2004, at 121, 123. 
 76 Mertus, supra note 74, at 1304 (citing Interview by Julie Mertus with Nancy Paterson, Former Senior 
Trial Att’y, ICTY, in D.C. (Feb. 2004)).  
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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female investigatory team was the first step in developing a cohesive gender 
strategy for the prosecution of sexually violent crimes. 
Goldstone himself participated in training sessions, attended women’s 
conferences addressing gender issues, and emphasized his respect for the 
Gender Advisor.79 He committed the OTP to the position that “sexual 
assaults . . . provide the basis for justiciable charges of torture,” a complete 
turnaround from the characterization of rape in previous indictments, such as 
the Tadić case.80 After Goldstone committed to eliminating gender bias in the 
OTP, the ICTY began making the first substantial contributions to sexual 
assault jurisprudence: For example, the FOCA indictment was the first 
international indictment to list rape as torture “and other forms of sexual 
violence, such as forced nudity and sexual entertainment, as inhumane 
treatment.”81 The elimination of gender bias in the OTP not only facilitated the 
investigation and indictment of sexually violent crimes, but also helped the 
ICTY form its influential body of jurisprudence regarding sexually violent 
crimes. 
C. Reluctant Witnesses 
The third and biggest obstacle to a successful indictment for sexual 
violence was—and remains—the reluctance of victims and witnesses to testify. 
The number of women who testified before the ICTY is very low: Between 
1996 and 2006, 3,700 witnesses testified before the ICTY, but only 666 
(eighteen percent) were women.82 The very first case before the ICTY 
contained a rape charge that had to be dropped because the key female witness 
was too scared to testify about her assault.83 
The international community recognizes that the heinous nature of sexually 
violent crimes requires the victims and witnesses to be offered extensive 
protection.84 The protection measures would need to ensure the privacy rights 
of the victims and allay the victims’ fear of reprisal after testifying. Although 
 
 79 Copelon, supra note 22, at 230.  
 80 Id. (quoting Letter from Justice Richard Goldstone, Prosecutor, U.N. Int’l Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to Rhonda Copelon, Professor of Law and Dir., Int’l Women’s Human 
Rights Law Clinic, City Univ. of N.Y. (Sept. 8, 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 Id. 
 82 U.N. ENTITY FOR GEND. EQUAL. & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 12, at 90.  
 83 HAGAN, supra note 63, at 80. 
 84 See The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. 
Res. 40/34, para. 6, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34, at 214 (Nov. 29, 1985); 
see also Secretary-General’s Report, supra note 42, para. 30. 
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the ICTY Statute includes specific protections for victims of sexual violence, 
these protections are inadequate. 
1. Victims’ Privacy and the Fear of Reprisals 
The privacy rights of the victims were a paramount concern to the drafters 
of the ICTY Statute. While a severe sense of shame and self-blame are 
commonly present in all rape victims,85 the creation of shame was often a 
primary intent of sexual assaults during the Yugoslav Wars.86 Many of the 
sexual assaults were conducted in ways that emphasized the shame: For 
example, at times family members were forced to rape each other in front of 
other family members or in public.87 
Beyond intense shame and embarrassment, rape victims also commonly 
suffer from a host of psychological disorders, such as extreme nervousness, 
memory impairment, and post-traumatic stress disorder.88 Publicly speaking 
about the sexual abuse and confronting the abuser can exacerbate these 
psychological harms.89 
In addition to protecting the privacy rights of victims, the ICTY also 
needed to assuage the victims’ fear of reprisals. Perpetrators threatened to kill 
the families of their victims if the rapes were reported.90 These threats were 
especially effective against women whose husbands remained interned in 
detention centers.91 At times, the perpetrators threatened the murder of 
detained relatives to ensure that a woman would be so afraid for her family’s 
safety that she would not report her own rape.92 Reports were prevalent of 
soldiers, paramilitary members, and camp guards extracting women from 
 
 85 Int’l Human Rights Law Grp., No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based 
Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 91, 108 (1994) [hereinafter No Justice]. 
 86 Robinson, supra note 7, at 20 (“It has been said that women’s bodies are the fighting ground for the 
battle between men and since within many societies a woman’s chastity is a matter of family honour, rape is 
perceived to be the ultimate humiliation of the male enemy.”). 
 87 Letter dated May 24, supra note 31, para. 250(a). 
 88 No Justice, supra note 85, at 109; see also Brunet & Rousseau, supra note 5, at 37 (“Rape 
dehumanizes a woman and breaks down her sense of personal identity. It is an invasion of a woman’s body by 
force, an attack on her physical and emotional integrity. It is a hostile act and one of degrading violence. It is 
also . . . an expression of hatred toward women as a class.”).  
 89 No Justice, supra note 85, at 110. 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. The ICTY began prosecuting cases during the Yugoslav Wars, and thus many witnesses and 
victims had relatives who were still in detention facilities at the time interviews were conducted. See id.  
 92 Id.  
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refugee camps to rape the women.93 Local commanders, meanwhile, 
overlooked the perpetrators’ crimes. As of 1993, not a single Serbian soldier 
had been punished for the rape of a woman in a refugee camp.94 The U.N. even 
reported that those in authority not only condoned the mass rapes, but engaged 
in them.95 
Rape victims also faced ostracism in their local communities.96 Women 
often feared retaliatory abuse or abandonment by their husbands or relatives.97 
Rape destroyed communities, and the perpetrators used it as a method of 
terrorizing the civilian populations.98 The U.N. report describes the soldiers’ 
calculated use of rape to dissolve local communities: 
[P]aramilitary units would enter a village. Several women would be 
raped in the presence of others so that word spread throughout the 
village and a climate of fear was created. . . . Those male villagers 
who had wanted to stay then decided to leave with their women and 
children in order to protect them from being raped.99 
The possibility of retaliation—reinforced by official involvement in and 
sanction of the abuses—required the development and implementation of 
protections for victims and witnesses. 
2. The ICTY’s Statutory Protections for Victims 
Acknowledging the reluctance of victims and witnesses to testify, the ICTY 
Statute provides protections that seek to minimize re-traumatization of the 
victim, prevent public humiliation, and safeguard against reprisals.100 The 
strength of the Statute’s protections lies in their specificity and mandatory 
application. 
 
 93 Letter dated May 24, supra note 31, para. 247, at 58.  
 94 No Justice, supra note 85, at 98 n.27. 
 95 Special Rapporteur of the Comm. on Human Rights, Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Comm’n on Human Rights, para. 48(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, 
Annex II (Feb. 10, 1993) (by Tadeusz Mazowiecki) [hereinafter Mazowiecki Report]. One woman reported 
being abducted by a policeman and transported to the home of one of the most prominent political figures in 
the region, who then raped her. Id.  
 96 No Justice, supra note 85, at 108. 
 97 Id. at 110. 
 98 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 110, 120 
(“[A]s the stigma of rape was seen to be effective in driving away women and their families from the lands 
that Serbs sought to conquer, rape indeed became a new and gruesome weapon in the ancient quiver of ethnic 
cleansing.”). 
 99 Mazowiecki Report, supra note 95, para. 48(a). 
 100 See Statute of the ICTY, supra note 45, art. 22. 
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In addition to the broad protections available for all victims and witnesses, 
victims of sexually violent crimes are guaranteed additional protections under 
Rule 96.101 The provisions of Rule 96 effectively lighten the burden of proof in 
rape cases.102 Rule 96 establishes certain presumptions that encourage victims 
to testify.103 First, the testimony of a rape victim is afforded the same 
presumption of validity as that of other crime victims, and therefore does not 
require any additional corroboration through evidence or eyewitness 
testimony.104 Sexual assault does note always leave physical evidence, and 
even when it does, the victim rarely reports the crime immediately.105 During 
the Yugoslav Wars, victims rarely had access to any medical services,106 
meaning they could not preserve the evidence even if they wanted to. In the 
absence of a corroboration requirement, the testifying victim is given an 
inherent measure of credibility. 
Second, the defendant is often precluded from raising consent as a 
defense.107 To raise the issue of consent, the defendant must provide evidence 
of the consent that is relevant and credible.108 Furthermore, the burden of proof 
for the affirmative defense is on the defendant.109 In essence, the defendant 
would have to prove the negative: that the victim was not subjected to or 
threatened with violence.110 
Finally, Rule 96 also creates a type of “rape shield law.” The Trial 
Chamber must exclude any evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim 
and cannot infer from a victim’s sexual history that she consented to sexual 
contact in the present instance.111 Any evidence of prior sexual behavior is 
inadmissible, even prior sexual acts between the victim and accused.112 Rule 
 
 101 See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, r. 
96, U.N. Doc. IT-32/Rev. 48 (Nov. 19, 2012) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available 
at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032Rev48_en.pdf.  
 102 See id. r. 96(i). 
 103 See id. r. 96(ii)–(iv). 
 104 Id. Many national jurisdictions still require corroboration, though many are moving toward abolition of 
the requirement. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 601 (1996). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 101, r. 96(ii).  
 108 Id. r. 96(iii). 
 109 Id.  
 110 BASSIOUNI, supra note 104, at 602. 
 111 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 101, r. 96(iv). 
 112 Compare id. (excluding all prior sexual conduct of the victim from being admitted into evidence), with 
FED. R. EVID. 412 (allowing some specific instances of prior sexual conduct of the victim to be admitted into 
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96’s protections encourage victims of sexual crimes to testify while protecting 
the victims from harassment, intimidation, and an invasion of privacy. 
3. Failure of the ICTY’s Victim Protections 
Despite its specificity and mandatory application, Rule 96 still fails to 
protect victims of sexual assault adequately. First, correct application of Rule 
96 requires constant vigilance by the judiciary. In Mucić, the Defense was able 
to circumvent Rule 96 and question the victim about her prior sexual history.113 
The defense questioned the victim about a previous abortion—which is 
prohibited by Rule 96.114 After a motion to redact by the prosecution, the Trial 
Chamber re-emphasized the importance and applicability of Rule 96 and 
expunged the victim’s testimony from the trial record.115 The treatment of 
victims in the Mucić case highlights the need for constant vigilance on the part 
of the judiciary for the protection of victims. 
Even constant vigilance by the judiciary will not ensure victim privacy. In 
fact, in Furundžija, the judiciary actively permitted an incredible assault on 
victim’s rights and privacy.116 After his conviction, Furundžija brought a 
motion to set aside the evidence of Witness A on the basis that he had been 
prejudiced by the non-disclosure of Witness A’s rape counseling records.117 
The Trial Chamber agreed, ordered the proceedings to be “reopened only in 
connection with the medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment or 
counseling received by Witness A after May 1993” and ordered the 
prosecution to disclose any connected documents.118 This extremely broad 
order allowed the defense access to all of a testifying victim’s medical records, 
regardless of the records’ relevance to the trial. Furthermore, presenting the 
psychological records of a victim inherently undermines her credibility. 
Indeed, once the victim’s medical records were made available, the defense 
 
evidence). In U.S. federal courts, the accused can submit evidence of specific instances of the victim’s prior 
sexual conduct with someone other than the accused to show that the defendant was not the source of semen or 
injury. The defendant may also offer evidence of past sexual behavior between the accused and the victim on 
the issue of consent. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)(A–B). 
 113 Prosecutor v. Mucić, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Prosector’s Motion for the Redaction of the 
Public Record, para. 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 5 1997).  
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. paras. 52, 58–60. 
 116 See Prosecutor v. Furundz̆ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgement, para. 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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questioned her credibility because she suffered from post-traumatic stress 
disorder.119 
Fortunately, the Trial Chamber rejected the contention that the victim was 
unreliable because she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.120 The 
release of her medical records and the public accusation that her psychological 
illnesses inherently made her unreliable grossly violated the victim’s privacy. 
The ICTY should therefore explicitly prohibit the release of medical 
information to protect the privacy of victims. Without ensuring the privacy of 
victims and witnesses, the ICTY will not be able to encourage reluctant 
witnesses to testify. 
D. Lack of Coordination Between the Office of the Prosecutor and the Victims 
and Witnesses Unit 
The fourth obstacle involved ensuring victims protection during the course 
of investigations. Because of the substantial stigma and psychological trauma 
sexual assault victims and witnesses face, the OTP originally planned to create 
special unit that would exclusively handle sexually violent crimes.121 This 
special Victims and Witnesses Unit would have provided extra training and 
experience to its investigators.122 In addition, the unit’s existence would have 
ensured that the OTP recognized the gravity of sexually violent crimes. As 
initially imagined, the VWU would have facilitated the investigation and 
prosecution of sexually violent crimes by virtue of its location within the OTP. 
The initial plan to structure the VWU within the OTP was ultimately 
rejected.123 Instead, the judges decided instead to incorporate the VWU under 
the office of the Registrar.124 The creation of the VWU in the Registrar shifted 
the emphasis of its work from ensuring effective investigation and prosecution 
of sensitive cases to providing counseling and support services to the victims 
 
 119 Id. para. 102.  
 120 Id. 
 121 Antonio Cassese, President, Int’l Tribunal for Crimes in Former Yugoslavia, Statement by the 
President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions: Summary of the Rules of Procedure at the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia U.N. Doc. IT/29 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA 
MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA653 (1995). 
 122 Id. 
 123 See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 101, r. 34.  
 124 Id. 
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and witnesses.125 The VWU therefore became more concerned with restorative 
justice rather than retributive justice. 
While the VWU has undoubtedly provided immeasurable help and services 
for victims, the shift in its emphasis has led to less effective prosecutions by 
the OTP. The OTP can still request special protection measures for victims and 
witnesses,126 but by placing the VWU under the office of the Registrar, the 
Statute increased the complexity of coordination between the OTP and VWU, 
which in turn led to prosecutorial error. 
IV.  PROSECUTORIAL ERROR 
Even if all the barriers that make prosecution inherently difficult are 
removed, successful prosecutions of sexual violence in the ICTY are not 
guaranteed. The prosecutions of sexually violent crimes have been undermined 
in two ways. First, the OTP has used its prosecutorial discretion to omit 
charges of sexual violence despite sufficient evidence. Second, the Prosecutor 
has made inexcusable errors, such as presenting evidence that is inconsistent 
with the alleged crimes. Both prosecutorial discretion and error have 
contributed to the poor success rate for prosecuting sexually violent crimes. 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and the Non-Inclusion of Rape Charges in 
Indictments 
The first way a prosecution for sexually violent crimes can be undermined 
is through the unwise use of prosecutorial discretion. In the beginning, the 
OTP often exercised its discretion by not including rape charges in 
indictments, even when the evidence warranted such a charge.127 While the 
ICTY has a better record than other tribunals of including sexual assault 
charges in indictments,128 the Lukić case is a paradigmatic example of the 
unwise use of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
 125 See Cassese, supra note 121, at 653. 
 126 See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 101, r. 69.  
 127 Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion Seeking 
Leave To Amend the Second Amended Indictment and on Prosecution Motion To Include U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1820 (2008) as Additional Supporting Material to Proposed Third Amended Indictment as 
Well as on Milan Lukić’s Request for Reconsideration on Certification of the Pre-Trial Judges Order of 19 
June 2008, paras. 12, 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 8, 2008) (citing Prosecutor v. Lukić 
& Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave To Amend the Second Amended 
Indictment, para. 14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2008) (filed confidentially)). 
 128 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 
Sept. 2, 1998) (in a case before the ICTR, despite the testimony of three witnesses concerning acts of sexual 
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During the investigation of Milan Lukić, many women alleged that the 
defendant had sexually assaulted them.129 The Prosecutor at the time of the 
initial indictment, Carla del Ponte, did not include any charges of sexual 
assault against Lukić.130 Del Ponte defended her decision by stating that 
ICTY’s completion strategy required her to conclude her cases as quickly as 
possible.131 She believed that sexually violent crimes would result in a lengthy 
case.132 In essence, Del Ponte acknowledged that the crimes of sexual violence 
occurred, but refused to prosecute them based on a misunderstanding of the 
ICTY’s completion timeline. 
Del Ponte’s successor tried to rectify her erroneous reasoning. The new 
Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, filed a motion to amend the Lukić indictment to 
include charges of sexual assault.133 In the motion to amend, the Prosecutor 
noted the incongruence of allowing victims to testify about their sexual assault 
while at the same time shielding the defendant from prosecution for sexual 
assault.134 Despite evidence of “very serious sex crimes,”135 the Trial Chamber 
denied the motion to amend.136 The Trial Chamber explained that the inclusion 
of new charges would result in an undue delay of the trial proceedings137 and 
 
violence, the Prosecutor did not investigate or formally charge the defendant until nine months after the start of 
the trial); see also Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave 
To Amend the Indictment, para. 86 (Special Court for Sierra Leone May 20, 2004) (in a case before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Trial Chamber refused to allow the Prosecutor to add charges of sexual 
violence to the original indictment). 
 129 Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave To Amend 
the Second Amended Indictment and on Prosecution Motion To Include U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1820 (2008) as Additional Supporting Material to Proposed Third Amended Indictment as Well as on Milan 
Lukić’s Request for Reconsideration on Certification of the Pre-Trial Judges Order of 19 June 2008, paras. 12, 
60. 
 130 See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Initial Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugolsavia Jan. 25, 2000). 
 131 Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave To Amend 
the Second Amended Indictment and on Prosecution Motion To Include U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1820 (2008) as Additional Supporting Material to Proposed Third Amended Indictment as Well as on Milan 
Lukić’s Request for Reconsideration on Certification of the Pre-Trial Judges Order of 19 June 2008, paras. 12, 
60 (citing Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave To 
Amend the Second Amended Indictment, para. 14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 16, 2008) 
(filed confidentially)). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. para. 13. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Prosecution Motion Seeking Leave 
To Amend the Second Amended Indictment, paras. 16, 37). 
 136 Id. para. 64. 
 137 Id. para. 62. 
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“there is no miscarriage of justice in the present circumstances.”138 After the 
denial of the motion to amend, the Prosecutor made a motion for certification, 
which the Trial Chamber also denied.139 
Unfortunately, the Lukić case is not an isolated incident. In Nikolić, the 
defendant was initially charged with a variety of crimes against humanity and 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention including murder, torture, and 
inhumane acts.140 The initial indictment did not include a charge of rape.141 
During the evidentiary hearing to confirm the charges, the prosecution 
presented evidence that women and young girls were raped and sexually 
assaulted.142 Although the testimony of the women and girls implicated the 
defendant in the sexually violent crimes, the prosecution had not included a 
single charge of rape or sexual assault in the indictment.143 In its review of the 
indictment, the Trial Chamber sua sponte invited the Prosecutor to amend the 
charges to include rape.144 The amended indictment then included thirty-seven 
charges of sexual assault.145 The repeated failure to include charges of sexual 
violence despite sufficient evidence again illustrates the gender bias present in 
the OTP. 
B. Inconsistency Between Charges and Evidence 
The second way in which a prosecution may be undermined is through 
simple error. In the ICTY, this error often took of the form of presenting 
evidence that was inconsistent with the charges in the indictment.146 Whether 
caused by ineffective investigation strategies or a lack of coordination between 
 
 138 Id. para. 63. 
 139 Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for 
Certification To Appeal the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Prosecution Motion To Amend the Second Amended 
Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 19, 2008).  
 140 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-2-I, Initial Indictment, pmbl. (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Nov. 4, 1994). 
 141 See id. 
 142 Transcript of Record at 397, Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-2-I (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 11, 1995); Transcript of Record at 288, Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-2-I 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 10, 1995).  
 143 Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-2-I, Initial Indictment, pmbl. 
 144 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-2-I, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, para. 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 20, 1995). 
 145 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-01-2-I, First Amended Indictment, paras. 44–59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 12, 1999). 
 146 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-I, Judgement, para. 522 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007). 
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the OTP and VWU, lack of supporting facts hindered the prosecution of 
sexually violent crimes.147 
A clear example of this error is present in the Mrskić case, where the 
Prosecutor charged the defendants with crimes against humanity consisting of 
torture, deprivation of medical care, and sexual assault.148 The prosecution 
alleged that these crimes took place in a hospital in Ovcara, though it failed to 
provide any evidence of this allegation.149 Instead, the prosecution relied on 
evidence of sexual assault at a different hospital, in Vukova—an entirely 
different camp in an entirely different city.150 Although there was evidence of 
sexual assault at the hospital in Vukovar, the defendants were not charged with 
crimes that occurred in Vukovar, and consequently could not be prosecuted for 
them.151 At the same time, because evidence of sexual assault at Vukovar 
could not be used to establish a sexual assault in Ovcara, the defendants could 
not be convicted of sexual assault.152 Therefore, despite ample evidence that 
Mrskić was responsible for the sexual assault of hundreds of women, 
prosecutorial error prevented him from being convicted of the crime. 
The OTP committed a similar mistake in Delić. The initial indictment 
accused the defendant of rape at Kamenica Camp.153 However, the 
prosecution’s evidence indicated that the sexual assault had not occurred at 
Kamenica Camp, but rather at a different camp nearby.154 Again, because the 
OTP failed to double-check the name of the camp, all of the rape and sexual 
assault charges were dismissed.155 
The Mrskić and Delić cases are examples of simple prosecutorial error that 
have undermined the prosecution of sexually violent crimes. These errors were 
most likely symptoms of gender bias and a lack of a coherent strategy for 
prosecuting sexual assault cases. These errors illustrate the need not just for a 
comprehensive strategy, not just during the investigation stage, but throughout 
the whole prosecution. 
 
 147 See id. paras. 521–22. 
 148 Id. para. 519. 
 149 Id. paras. 519–21. 
 150 Id. para. 519. 
 151 Id. para. 521. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-PT, Indictment, paras. 41–43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Mar.17, 2005). 
 154 Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Judgement, para. 320 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008). 
 155 Id. annex B, para. 20. 
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Because of prosecutorial discretion and error, the conviction rate for 
sexually violent crimes in the ICTY has been lower than it should be. Some of 
these issues, such as gender bias and lack of expertise, have been successfully 
eradicated by the OTP’s commitment to incorporating gender strategy into its 
prosecutions. Other issues, such as the inadequacy of victim protections, 
remain stumbling blocks. The ICTY’s experience illustrates that successful 
prosecutions need not only a developed and inclusive jurisprudence, but also a 
dedicated, focused effort to prosecute sexually violent crimes. 
The ICTY’s successes and failures become even more important as the 
ICTY itself is phased out. With the end of the ICTY approaching,156 many of 
its cases will be transferred to national court systems.157 These new court 
systems, such as the WCC,158 will encounter many of the same challenges the 
ICTY initially faced. However, by learning from the ICTY’s mistakes in 
prosecuting sexually violent crimes, the WCC should be able to avoid the 
pitfalls that plagued the prosecutions in the ICTY. 
V. SHIFTING FROM AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO A NATIONAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 
Acknowledging the mistakes the ICTY has made in prosecuting gender-
based crimes is important because the ICTY is currently shifting its caseload to 
the WCC.159 The WCC is based on the ICTY, both in jurisprudence and in 
structure.160 These two similarities were necessary both to ensure the 
continuing prosecution of crimes and to legitimize the WCC’s rulings. An 
unforeseen benefit, however, is that these similarities will allow the WCC to 
avoid the mistakes that the ICTY made in prosecuting sexually violent crimes. 
 
 156 S.C. Res. 1503, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003) (Aug. 28, 2003). 
 157 Id. para. 1. 
 158 Cf. id. 
 159 Cf. id. para. 7. 
 160 Cf. BOGDAN IVANIŠEVIĆ, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FROM HYBRID TO DOMESTIC COURT 6 (2008), available at 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Domestic-Court-2008-English.pdf. 
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A. History of the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia–Herzegovina 
The ICTY’s creation was spurred by the corruption of the Bosnian national 
system.161 During the Yugoslav Wars and immediately thereafter, the Bosnian 
national courts attempted to try war criminals.162 These prosecutions were 
rarely successful or fair.163 The Bosnian judiciary faced serious obstacles in the 
prosecution of war criminals: the loss of skilled lawyers and judges during the 
war, destruction of facilities and equipment, and inadequate procedural laws.164 
In addition, the police force responsible for investigating war crimes was 
plagued with allegations of corruption.165 Ethnic bias motivated many of the 
prosecutions, and the trials “were regarded as occasions for dispensing ‘ethnic’ 
justice or exacting revenge.”166 In one appeal to the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Court overturned a conviction on the basis that the defendant did 
not receive a fair trial in the former Yugoslavia.167 The fear of arbitrary arrests 
and corrupt trials prevented the Bosnian national justice system from gaining 
legitimacy after the wars ended. 
The Bosnian national justice system’s inability to prosecute war crimes 
effectively motivated the creation of the ICTY in 1993.168 Now, twenty years 
later, the ICTY’s completion strategy has been the catalyst for the creation of 
the WCC, a special national court that specializes in prosecuting war crimes.169 
 
 161 See ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR. [OSCE], WAR CRIMES TRIALS BEFORE THE DOMESTIC 
COURTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES 3 (2005) [hereinafter OSCE REPORT], 
available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2010122311024992eng.pdf. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 4.  
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia—Transferring War Crimes Prosecution from the International 
Tribunal to Domestic Court, 14 CRIM. L.F. 59, 67 (2003). 
 167 See Damjanović v. Fed’n of Bosn. & Herz., Case No. CH/96/30, para. 40 (H.R. Cham. for Bosn. & 
Herz. Sept. 5, 1997), available at http://www.hrc.ba/database/decisions/CH96-30%20Damjanovic%20Merits 
%20E.pdf (ruling that the trial court “lacked a sufficient appearance of independence”). 
 168 See Completion Strategy, supra note 20.  
 169 E.g., S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 156, para. 7 (setting deadlines for the ICTY to conclude 
investigations, trial, and work, respectively); see also S.C. Res. 1534, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (2004) 
(Mar. 26, 2004) (requiring periodic updates from the ICTR and ICTY on the implementation of the completion 
strategy). For a brief overview of the implementation of the completion strategy, see Completion Strategy, 
supra note 20.  
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B. Similarities Between the ICTY and the WCC 
The ICTY influenced the WCC’s basic structure. The WCC has an Office 
of the Prosecutor, a judicial branch, and a Registry.170 As in the ICTY, the 
Prosecutor is responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes, the judicial 
branch is composed of trial and appellate courts, and the Registry handles the 
administrative functions of the WCC.171 The WCC’s structural similarity to the 
ICTY was based on its desire to bring its national prosecutions up to 
international standards. 
The WCC’s jurisprudence is also influenced by the ICTY. The WCC has 
subject matter jurisdiction over three types of crimes: genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.172 The definitions of these crimes are generally 
consistent with the parallel definitions in the ICTY, allowing the ICTY to refer 
cases to the WCC.173 Although the WCC does not officially incorporate the 
ICTY’s jurisprudence,174 the WCC “brings with it as persuasive authority its 
international legal heritage, as well as the international jurisprudence that 
interprets and applies it.”175 The ICTY’s rulings are considered persuasive 
authority that is necessary to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and 
application of legal rules.176 
Since its creation in 2005, the WCC has made significant contributions to 
the prosecution of war crimes—and of sexually violent crimes in particular. 
Unlike the ICTY Charter, the WCC’s Charter explicitly lists sexually violent 
crimes.177 Furthermore, twenty-six cases have included charges of sexual 
 
 170 OSCE REPORT, supra note 161, at 6.  
 171 Id. at 6–7. 
 172 Id. at 7. In contrast to the ICTY, however, the WCC will focus its prosecution on mid-level and low-
level perpetrators, rather than on high-level perpetrators. Id. at 6. 
 173 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 101, r. 11bis, at 8–9. There are some differences in 
the definitions of the crimes; for example, the Bosnian definition of “crime against humanity” does not require 
a nexus between the act and an armed conflict. KRIVIČNI ZAKON [Criminal Law] art. 172 (Bosn. & Herz.). This 
and other differences generally occur because the Bosnian Criminal Code provision is tracking the ICC Statute 
rather than the ICTY Statute. YAËL RONEN, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE 
ICTY AND DOMESTIC COURTS IN ADJUDICATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 41 (2008), available at 
http://www.domac.is/media/veldu-flokk/Domac8-2011-YR.pdf. 
 174 RONEN, supra note 173, at 42. 
 175 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Stupar, Case No. X-KR-05/24, at 53, First Instance Verdict, (Sud Bosne I 
Hercegovine [Court of Bosn. & Herz.] July 29, 2008), available at http://ebookbrowse.com/milos-stupar-i-dr-
1st-instance-verdict-pdf-d141288650).  
 176 Id.  
 177 KRIVIČNI ZAKON [Criminal Law] arts. 172(1)(g), 173(1)(e).  
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violence.178 These cases involved charges of sexual violence in detention 
facilities,179 as a method of ethnic cleansing,180 and of sexual violence against 
males.181 Despite the early success in charging and prosecuting sexual 
violence, the WCC needs significant improvements to increase accountability 
for sexually violent crimes. 
The intentional similarities between the WCC and the ICTY allow the 
effective transfer of cases and creates a feeling of familiarity to those involved. 
However, the similarities between the WCC and ICTY can be further used to 
prosecute sexually violent crimes successfully. By incorporating the lessons 
that the ICTY learned, the WCC can effectively and efficiently prosecute 
sexually violent crimes from the start. 
VI.  USING LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ICTY TO IMPROVE PROSECUTIONS 
FOR SEXUALLY VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBERS 
The WCC faces many similar challenges to prosecuting sexually violent 
crimes that plagued the ICTY: (1) lack of expertise in the WCC, (2) 
prosecutorial discretion, and (3) inadequate witness protections. Unlike the 
ICTY, however, the WCC does not need to start from scratch. Instead, the 
WCC can use and improve on the lessons learned at the ICTY. Each of these 
challenges and the possible improvements will be discussed in turn. 
A. Lack of Expertise in the WCC 
The first challenge the WCC must overcome is its inadequate investigation 
procedures. The prosecutor, in conjunction with the War Crimes Unit 
(“WCU”), is responsible for investigating war crime allegations.182 Just like in 
 
 178 Claire Garbett, Localising Criminal Justice: An Overview of National Prosecutions at the War Crimes 
Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 558, 567 (2010). 
 179 See Prosecutor v. Mejakić, Case No. X-KR-06/200, Verdict, at 5, 7, 10, 13 (Court of Bosn. & Herz. 
May 30, 2008), available at http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/presude/2008/Zeljko_Mejakic_First_ 
Instance_Verdict.pdf. 
 180 See id. at 2. 
 181 See Prosecutor v. Kurtović, Case No. X-KR-06/299, Verdict, at 3 (Court of Bosn. & Herz. Apr. 30, 
2008), available at http://sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/presude/2008/Zijad_Kurtovic_-_1st_instance_verdict_-
_redigovana.pdf. 
 182 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA 13 (2006) [hereinafter LOOKING FOR JUSTICE], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/reports/ij0206webwcover.pdf (stating that the “the SIPA War Crimes Unit (WCU) has the potential to 
provide substantial assistance to the Special Department for War Crimes, as well as to prosecutors at the 
district and cantonal levels, on a long-term and sustainable basis”). 
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the ICTY, the main issue in ensuring effective prosecutions is the lack of 
expertise among investigators and prosecutors. 
Prosecutors in the WCC lack even basic training in prosecuting war crimes 
and investigatory procedures. In one survey, two prosecutors admitted they had 
not received any training in regard to prosecuting war crimes, nine prosecutors 
stated they did not have access to a legal library, five prosecutors stated their 
library was insufficiently stocked, and only four prosecutors’ offices had 
internet access.183 Without basic resources and training, WCC prosecutors are 
not able to prosecute any crimes effectively, let alone sexually violent crimes. 
The lack of training is also a problem for investigators. As of 2007, no 
WCU investigator had received training in investigating sexual violence or 
working with victims.184 There have been reports of investigators taking 
inadequate witness statements or not realizing the witness has made an 
incriminating statement.185 Without proper training, the WCU investigators 
cannot recognize the very crimes they are meant to investigate. 
The necessary training has not been offered to prosecutors and investigators 
because of a lack of funding in the WCC. However, this is where the current 
international/national hybrid nature of the WCC will be helpful. Many of the 
international persons working within the WCC also have experience working 
the same types of cases in the ICTY.186 The WCC should incorporate and rely 
on their experiences before the WCC becomes a completely national court in 
2014. Maximizing the use of the information from these international persons 
is the first small step towards improving training. 
Lack of basic training plagues the WCC, as it plagued the ICTY. 
Unfortunately, because sexually violent crimes are among the most difficult to 
investigate,187 this means they will probably not be pursued or prosecuted. The 
 
 183 OSCE REPORT, supra note 161, at 45. 
 184 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NARROWING THE IMPUNITY GAP: TRIALS BEFORE BOSNIA’S WAR CRIMES 
CHAMBER 17 (2007) [hereinafter NARROWING THE IMPUNITY GAP], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
2007/ij0207/ij0207webwcover.pdf.  
 185 Id. at 14.  
 186 See, e.g., Garbett, supra note 178 (acknowledging the similarity between the cases in the ICTY and the 
WCC). The WCC is inherently receptive to international support because the international community holds 
certain executive powers in Bosnia (“Bonn powers”). RONEN, supra note 173, at 8–9. 
 187 See NARROWING THE IMPUNITY GAP, supra note 184, at 17 (“[A] number of cases within the chamber’s 
jurisdiction involve victims, witnesses, and/or defendants who have relocated to other countries in the former 
Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Croatia. The prosecution must therefore rely heavily on cooperation with the 
authorities in these and other states in order to obtain evidence, locate witnesses and, in some cases, arrest 
defendants in relation to proceedings before the chamber.”); see also Kim Thuy Seelinger et al., The 
GINN GALLEYSPROOFS2 7/16/2013  10:36 AM 
594 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
prosecutors need access to resources on the jurisprudence of sexual violence as 
a war crime and as a crime against humanity. The investigators need 
specialized training in investigating sexually violent crimes and working with 
witnesses and victims. Adequate resources and training are imperative to the 
appropriate investigation of sexually violent crimes, which can be very 
complex and difficult to prosecute. 
B. Prosecutorial Discretion in the WCC 
The second challenge the WCC faces is the possible abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion. The fact that the WCC is underfunded and understaffed188 raises 
issues concerning prosecutorial discretion. Aside from those cases referred by 
the ICTY, the WCC Prosecutor has the discretion to pursue and prosecute his 
own cases.189 The number of cases that could possibly be brought is incredibly 
high.190 As seen in the ICTY, cases involving sexual violence are not as likely 
to be pursued by prosecutors unless there is a firm gender strategy in place.191 
Due to the shortage of resources at the WCC, a fair case selection policy is 
important to both the successful prosecution of sexually violent crimes and the 
overall legitimacy of the court. 
The WCC Prosecutor’s case selection policy, however, does not 
incorporate a gender strategy that will ensure the prosecution of sexually 
violent crimes. Currently, the Prosecutor pursues cases it deems “highly 
sensitive” based on factors such as “the nature of the crime alleged . . . whether 
additional investigations are necessary[,] difficulties in locating the suspect(s)[, 
and] the availability of witnesses . . . .”192 This information is difficult to 
provide in cases of sexual violence, especially with untrained investigators.193 
Therefore, cases of sexual violence are less likely to be deemed “highly 
sensitive” by the Prosecutor. Because the WCC’s case selection process relies 
 
Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence 19 (Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Cal. Berkley, Sexual 
Violence & Accountability Project, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
HRCweb/pdfs/SVA_IandP.pdf (highlighting a number of challenges to investigating crimes involving sexual 
violence). But see Garbett, supra note 178 (finding that there are a “high number of cases [in the WCC that] 
includ[e] charges of sexual violence”).  
 188 See LOOKING FOR JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 11–12. 
 189 See NARROWING THE IMPUNITY GAP, supra note 184, at 8–9; see also OSCE Report, supra note 161, at 
18.  
 190 See OSCE Report, supra note 161, at 6 (between 1996 and 2005, the ICTY Rules of the Road Unit 
received criminal files on 5789 people).  
 191 See supra Part III.B. 
 192 NARROWING THE IMPUNITY GAP, supra note 184, at 8–9. 
 193 Id. at 14.  
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so heavily on information that is difficult to provide in sexually violent crimes, 
it is unlikely the Prosecutor will pursue these crimes. 
The current case selection policy also undermines the legitimacy of the 
WCC. While the Prosecutor has enumerated some factors that determine 
whether the case is “highly sensitive,”194 the evaluation of these factors has not 
been explained. There are no details on how these factors are weighed, and 
therefore, the process of case selection is largely opaque.195 Inadequate 
information about the case selection process negatively impacts the public’s 
perception of the WCC and has “led to significant uncertainty regarding the 
department’s priorities.”196 Certainly, damaging the public’s perception of the 
WCC will prevent cooperation by the public and will discourage victims from 
coming forward. 
In response to the negative publicity, the WCC announced a new case 
selection policy in 2009: a Situation-Event-Act-Actor (“SEAA”) approach.197 
The SEAA approach’s purpose is to streamline investigations.198 The SEAA 
approach will require the investigators to look broadly at the crimes that 
occurred during the Bosnian wars, rather than focusing on individual 
complaints.199 The WCC also implemented a new charging policy that attempts 
to increase the number of accused in a single prosecution, while at the same 
time reducing the number of charges in each case.200 Because of the new case 
selection policy, the WCC expects less court time, fewer witnesses, and less 
evidence, all of which will save the court’s meager resources.201 
While it is too early to observe the actual effects of the new case selection 
policies, the efforts to streamline the investigations could definitely decrease 
the number of prosecutions for sexually violent crimes. As seen in the ICTY, 
when a prosecutor decides to press fewer charges, sexually violent criminal 
charges are usually the first to be dropped.202 Furthermore, because evidence 
and witnesses are difficult to discover, investigators are more likely to use their 
 
 194 Id. at 9. 
 195 Id. (“[T]he department has not adequately articulated to the public the criteria for case selection and 
their application, which has led to significant uncertainty regarding the department’s priorities.”). 
 196 Id. 
 197 David Schwendiman, Prosecuting Atrocity Crimes in National Courts: Looking Back on 2009 in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 8 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 269, 291–92 (2010).  
 198 Id. at 292. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 294–95.  
 201 Id. at 295. 
 202 See supra Part IV.A (explaining the Lukić case). 
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power to terminate the investigation when pursuing allegations sexually violent 
crimes. 
Again, a comprehensive gender strategy can curb the abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion. To prevent the new case selection policies from decreasing the 
number of prosecutions for sexually violent crimes, the WCC needs to create 
explicit standards for investigating and charging such crimes. An officer, 
similar to the Gender Advisor for the ICTY, could help formulate an effective 
method for pursuing sexually violent crimes efficiently. Furthermore, a team 
that specializes in investigating sexually violent crimes would also ensure that 
such crimes are prosecuted, while at the same time preventing the waste of 
valuable resources. All of these suggestions should be a part of the WCC 
Prosecutor’s commitment to an inclusive and expansive gender strategy, 
similar to Judge Goldstone’s commitment in the ICTY. 
C. Victim and Witness Protections in the WCC 
The third challenge the WCC faces is ensuring the privacy and dignity of 
witnesses, with respect to both investigators and the courts. Investigators must 
respect the trauma the witnesses have experienced. This sensitivity, in turn, 
will lead to better cooperation and information from witnesses. The courts, 
meanwhile, must provide both specific legal protections and increased judicial 
sensitivity to witnesses. Without specific protections and increased sensitivity 
by investigators and judges, victims of sexual assault will not be adequately 
protected from the resulting stigma and the possibility of retribution by the 
accused. 
To begin, investigators must be sensitive to the trauma the witnesses have 
experienced. Otherwise, victims and witnesses will be unwilling to help 
investigators. Currently, however, there is no formal training program for 
investigators on how to deal with witnesses.203 Instead, the WCC relies on 
international nongovernmental organizations to mediate when investigators 
interview victims of sexual assault.204 In addition to lacking a formal training 
program, the WCC also lacks any kind of guidelines for protecting witness 
sensitivity.205 As a result, there have been numerous complaints detailing the 
lack of sensitivity by investigators interviewing victims and witnesses.206 
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Inadequate training and a lack of sensitivity on behalf of the investigators 
results in both the re-traumatization of victims and the ineffective investigation 
of sexually violent crimes. 
This lack of sensitivity toward victims of sexually violent crimes is also 
evident in the Bosnian legal system. Although the Bosnian courts have 
implemented some general victim protections, there are no protections focused 
on victims of sexually violent crimes.207 The Bosnian laws meant to protect 
victims and witnesses are ineffective because they are too vague and place the 
burden of protecting victims on the judge.208 
The primary law protecting victims and witnesses is too general to afford 
specific, effective protection. Article 25 of the Law on Protection of Witnesses 
Under Threat and Vulnerable Witnesses vaguely requests that a court “adopt 
rules of procedure ensuring the appropriate use of the means to protect 
witnesses . . . .”209 These protections, available to victims and witnesses of all 
types of crimes, can include psychological and medical support, removal of the 
accused from the courtroom during testimony, and preventing the disclosure of 
the identity of the witness.210 As written, however, these protections are too 
vague to confidently ensure victim protection. 
For example, Article 6 nominally provides the victim with access to 
counseling: “[T]he Court . . . [shall] ensure that the body responsible for issues 
of social care is aware of the involvement of the vulnerable witness in the 
proceedings.”211 Article 6 is inadequate for several reasons. First, the onus is 
on the judge to recognize that the victim needs counseling.212 Not only may a 
judge be unable to recognize psychological trauma, but this also means that a 
victim will not have the possibility of counseling until after the indictment has 
been issued. This delay in access to care can re-traumatize the victim. In 
addition, the judge must only make the counseling body “aware” of the 
victim’s involvement.213 Article 6 does not mandate that counseling or care be 
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provided to a victim, just that a counselor be aware there is a victim who needs 
care.214 
As seen in Article 6, the Law on Protection of Witnesses Under Threat and 
Vulnerable Witnesses places much of the burden of protection on the judge.215 
Furthermore, all of these protections are subject to the judge’s complete 
discretion.216 The reliance on judges to protect victims is troublesome because 
judges themselves have exhibited insensitivity to female victims. For example, 
there have been instances of victim-blaming by judges in the WCC. One judge 
“asked a woman if she was a virgin at the time of the alleged rape, and what 
she looked like when she was 16.”217 If a judge does not find a sexual assault 
victim’s testimony convincing, the judge may remove the original protections. 
In one case, when the judges found the testimony of six (or seven) women 
unconvincing, the judges released their names to the public.218 Furthermore, it 
is not uncommon for the names of victims to be leaked to the press.219 The lack 
of specific protections in court and the insensitive treatment of the victims by 
judges mean that fewer women are willing to testify. Indeed, one victim stated, 
“It seems better to be a war criminal in this country than a victim.”220 
Here again the WCC should follow the ICTY’s lead. The WCC must 
provide adequate training to its investigators and recognize that victims of 
sexually violent crimes require significant, specific protections if they choose 
to testify. A comprehensive gender strategy, similar to the one formulated by 
the ICTY, could ensure that victims and witnesses are protected in the WCC. 
Bosnia took a significant step toward incorporating gender strategies in the 
WCC when it created the Witness Support Unit in 2011.221 The Witness 
Support Unit provides assistance and psychological counseling to victims, 
including victims of sexually violent crimes.222 Support services, such as legal 
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assistance, medical care, and counseling are provided for victims willing to 
testify. These support services facilitate investigations, encourage victims to 
testify, and minimize the risks of re-traumatization. 
The Bosnian Witness Support Unit is an improvement on the ICTY’s VWU 
because the Bosnian unit is placed within the Office of the Prosecutor.223 The 
Witness Support Unit’s organizational location within the OTP can facilitate 
coordination between the victims and the OTP, which in turn will facilitate the 
creation of a cohesive gender strategy. The Bosnian Witness Support Unit 
should take advantage of this facilitated coordination to enlighten 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges about sexual violence. By teaching about 
the effects of rape, the Witness Support Unit could alleviate gender bias in the 
system. Investigators could be trained to “recognize the range of effects that 
severe trauma may have on a person’s memory.”224 Information from the Unit 
could alert “judges to the fact that gaps in the memory of a rape survivor, far 
from discrediting her account, may signal the likelihood of trauma.”225 The 
Witness Support Unit could also help the judges in their evaluation of a 
victim’s testimony by having expert witnesses on hand to testify about the 
pattern of psychological recovery from rape. The Bosnian Witness Support 
Unit and the Prosecutor’s Office should therefore take advantage of the 
opportunities that their organizational proximity provides. 
In addition to maximizing the benefits of the Witness Support Unit, the 
WCC should incorporate a law similar to ICTY’s Rule 96, which provides 
explicit protections to victims of sexually violent crime.226 Such a law would 
apply to all sexual assault victims, and the protections should be mandatory 
rather than at the discretion of a judge. The inclusion ofrequirements that 
protect victims’ privacy and protect against retaliation will encourage victims 
to testify. 
Explicit, mandatory victim protections are often inadequate to truly protect 
victims, as seen in the ICTY.227 Concerning the WCC, gender bias in the 
judicial branch must also be overcome. Again, some of the biases may be 
overcome by making victim protections mandatory, rather than at the judge’s 
discretion. However, as illustrated by the ICTY,228 the eradication of gender 
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bias can be accomplished through a comprehensive gender strategy in all 
divisions of the WCC. 
In the absence of an office similar to the VWU, the ICTY’s experience 
provides other effective methods of incorporating a comprehensive gender 
strategy. Investigators need specialized training in dealing with victims of 
sexual assault instead of relying on nongovernmental organizations. In 
particular, the creation of a specialized team of female investigators that only 
pursues sexually violent crimes, similar to the one created by the ICTY, would 
greatly improve the chances of an indictment for sexual violence. Furthermore, 
like the provisions found in Article 96 in the ICTY,229 the WCC needs witness 
protection provisions that are specifically aimed at victims of sexual assault. 
Increased sensitivity toward victims of sexual violence will greatly facilitate 
the prosecution of those crimes. With better training, extensive victim 
protections, increased victim participation, and a comprehensive gender 
strategy, the WCC will be able to prosecute sexually violent crimes effectively 
while avoiding the mistakes of the ICTY. 
CONCLUSION 
Accountability and reconciliation remain paramount in post-conflict 
societies. Ensuring accountability for crimes committed during the Yugoslav 
Wars was—and remains—an especially difficult challenge.230 The 
reinvigoration of the Bosnian justice system provides an optimistic opportunity 
to acknowledge and prosecute these crimes. As a relatively young legal 
system,231 however, the Bosnian courts should reflect on and learn from the 
lessons of the ICTY, especially those that involve the prosecution of sexually 
violent crimes. 
Sexually violent crimes committed during conflict are serious violations of 
international law,232 and must be treated as such. If sexually violent crimes are 
nominally labeled violations of international law, but never prosecuted, then 
the law does not provide justice or redress to the victims. If there are no 
prosecutions for sexually violent crimes, then the legal system implicitly 
expresses a tolerance for these crimes. Although the ICTY initially struggled 
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with the prosecution of sexually violent crimes, it also made remarkable 
strides.233 
The WCC faces many of the same challenges in prosecuting sexually 
violent crimes that the ICTY encountered: lack of expertise and training, 
reluctant witnesses, and the inherent difficulties of prosecuting sexual 
crimes.234 However, the WCC need not make the same errors as the ICTY. 
Instead, the WCC should use the experiences and knowledge of the ICTY to 
avoid making the same mistakes. The fundamental lesson learned from the 
ICTY is the importance of a coherent and cohesive legal strategy for 
prosecuting sexually violent crimes. A fully integrated gender strategy must 
include the elimination of gender bias, a commitment to the prosecution of 
gender crimes, and the protection of victims and witnesses. This legal strategy 
could include specially trained investigators, a gender advisor in the OTP, and 
explicit protections for victims throughout the investigatory process and trial. 
By learning from the ICTY’s experience, the WCC can effectively prosecute 
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